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CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN EMINENT DOMAIN
IN PENNSYLVANIA.*
DAMAGES TO PROPERTY IN THE VICINITY.
In this case the property damaged is not actually taken, it
is merely injured or destroyed,"5 consequent upon the taking of
the other land in the vicinity. We must distinguish between
construction and operation. In neither case was there any right
of recovery before the Constitution of 1874 except in the case
of negligence. The constitutional provision vests in an owner,
whose land is not taken, a right to recover damages caused by
the construction or enlargement of the work on the land taken,
and since no statute has been passed the remedy is solely by an
action of trespass."
Questions may arise as to the liability of the corporation
to an adjoining owner as such entirely apart from the law of
eminent domain.5 7
It was well settled that.there was no liability to an adjoin-
ing owner for damages caused by the operation of the works
on the land acquired by purchase, gift, or under proceedings in
eminent domain, in the absence of negligence, where the cor-
poration had the power of eminent domain.58
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'Of course, if the property is real estate it cannot be destroyed. This
word can only be taken to refer to improvements upon the land.
"Accordingly, in the following cases there was a recovery: Fredericks v.
Canal Co., 148 Pa. 3t7 (1892). This was an action on the case against the
canal company to recover damages for overflowing plaintiff's land caused by
raising of defendant's dam. The defendant probably had the power of emi-
nent domain, although not so expressly stated. Crum v. R. R. Co., 226 Pa.
151 (igio) : damages to plaintiff's water power caused by change in bed of
stream on land adjoining.
"E.g.-Lateral support, Ruppert v. Railroad Co., 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 613
(i9o4); Pettit v. Railroad Co., 222 Pa. 49o (igog); diversion of water,
Todd v. Railroad Company, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 577 (19o).
' In these cases there was no recovery in an action of trespass on the
case*- Railroad Co. v. Lippincott, 116 Pa. 472 (1887). The court said that
the injury arose from operation, that the rule in the state was to impose
on corporations a direct responsibility for everything for which a natural
person would be liable: that the rule is not to be departed from; that the
defendant was not liable unless guilty of a nuisance, which the court
(145)
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These consequential damages are not recoverable under the
Constitution of 1874 because the proviso imposes a liability for
the construction and enlargement of the works, not for opera-
tion. This point has not been taken in the Supreme Court.. The
grounds upon which the courts limited -the liability for the opera-
tion of the works is not altogether clear. The principal reason
advanced was that the damages are too remote, and speculative,
such damages as are inflicted on everyone else in the neighbor-
hood, and to impose them would ruin the public enterprise.
There are, however, two recent cases in which the Supreme
Court appears to depart from the former rule and lay down
the principle that the power of eminent domain does not con-
fer an immunity where the operation of the works amouits to
a nuisance. In Stokes v. Railroad Company,"9 a property owner
brought an action at law against the railroad company for dam-
ages caused by the operation of a tower on the right of way,
to wit, a flow of acids from the tower house. The plaintiff al-
leged negligence. A nonsuit was reversed on appeal, the Su-
preme Court in an opinion by Stewart, J., saying that the action
was for damages caused by the maintenance of a nuisance, that
negligence was not involved and the allegations of it were
immaterial, and the plaintiff was therefore entitled to go to the
jury. Nothing was said by the court about the proposition laid
down in the former cases, that the power of eminent domain
takes away the nuisance character of the acts.
In Ganster v. Electric Light Co.,60 the plaintiff was held
entitled to recover damages in an action of trespass caused by
seemed to think would be the making of more smoke or dust than is law-
fully allowable in the working of its machinery. Railroad Company v.
Marchant, 119 Pa. 54x (1888); Dooner v. Railroad Company, 142 Pa. 36
(i89i); Wunderlich v. Railroad Company, 223 Pa. 114 (igog), accord.
Himmell v. Railroad Co., 175 Pa. 537 (896), filling between piers of bridge
on right of way. Gilles v. Railroad Company, 226 Pa. 3! (igog); Ridgway
v. Railroad Company, 244 Pa. 282 (1914), elevation of track on right of
way. In these cases of elevation of tracks, it might be possible to argue
that the corporation was enlarging its works and thus incurring a liability
for the damages under the strict construction of the constitutional provision
imposing a liability for property injured or destroyed by construction or
enlargement.
M214 Pa. 415 ('9o6).
"214 Pa. 628 (906).
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the operation of an electric light plant company which had no
power of eminent domain. The case is not in point as a deci-
sion, but the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mestrezat, J.,
said, by way of dictumn,'" that if the annoyance or damage
arising from a nuisance is such as to destroy or substantially
impair the legitimate use or occupation of private property and
so amount to a taking the property owner injured is entitled
to recover notwithstanding the fact that the defendant company
possesses the power of eminent domain. The court distin-
guished Railroad Company v. Lippincott,62 on the ground that
there the defendant's land was on the other side of the street
from the property of the plaintiff. It is submitted, however,
that there are many cases where the operation of the public
works will seriously depreciate the value of the property and
inflict the same damage as if a part were taken, and yet there
is no recovery. The rule laid down in this dictim makes the
right of the plaintiff to recover depend upon the extent and
amount of the damage. It is apprehended, however, that the
distinction taken as to the case of Railroad Company v. Lippin-.
cott is not in point because the fact that there was a street
between seems to be entirely immaterial, as in that case the plain-
tiff's right to recover did not.depend at all upon the fact that
he was an abutting owner on the street, and the Supreme Court
treated the case entirely as if the street were not there.
Williams, J., in Insurance Co. v. Railroad,3 said that in
order to sustain recovery the property must be that which is.
invaded in the exercise of the right of eminent -domain or that
which abuts on the highway which is invaded, and that there
is no authority for the proposition that the property alleged -to
have been injured need not adjoin nor have any physical rela-
tion to the defendant's work. This is open to serious question.
Where, however, there is no power of eminent domain, the
corporation is liable for any. use of the land beyond the limits
allowed at common law, irrespective of negligence. In these
'At p. 632.
"xz6 Pa. 472 (1887).
'xis$ Pa. 334 at 339 (892).
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cases the corporation is said to be guilty of maintaining a nui-
sance." It is probable that a coal railroad built and operated
on coal land in Pennsylvania would not be a nuisance.6
5
DISTURBANCE OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS.
We have now reached in the discussion the case of damage
to abutting and non-abutting owners caused by a disturbance
of a public highway which may be by change of grade, by the
construction, enlargement, or operation of (a) a public use, (b)
a sewer within the lines of the highway.
Clange of Grade.
A change in the grade of an existing highway may- and
generally does depreciate the value of the abutting property.
There is in this case no exercise of the power of eminent do-
main, as there is no taking of property. The taking having
occurred when the highway was first opened, the right to re-
cover depends entirely on the constitutional provision or statutes
passed in pursuance thereof, and it is not necessary for the
abutting owner to show any title to the bed of the street in
order to recover." The grade may be changed by the city or
by a private corporation constructing or enlarging its works
in the vicinity.
The right to recover damages for change of grade is con-
ferred by several statutes, and the law is clear that where a
"A few of these cases are as follows: Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy,
39 Pa. 258 (x86), where it was held that the gas company was liable
in trespass for damages caused by the maintenance of gas works. The
company had no power of eminent domain, only the right to enter upon
streets, lanes and alleys. Rogers v. Phila. Traction Co., 182 Pa. 473 (1897).
Hauck v. Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366 (1893). The dictum of this case is
that the power of eminent domain takes away the characteristics of a
nuisance. Ganster v. Electric Light Co., 214 Pa. 628 (19o6), trespass,
electric light plant. A bill in equity for an injunction will lie to restrain
operation of a railroad constructed without power of eminent domain as
being a nuisance, Stewart's App., 56 Pa. 413 (1867); the railroad was
constructed in a private .alley of which the plaintiff's property had the
free use.
" For a case where there was such a railroad apparently not built under
the lateral railroad law, see Phillip v. Railway, 189 Pa. 309 (x899).
"Hobson v. Phila., ixo Pa. s (1892)5 -
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statute has been passed, the remedy of the land owner there-
on is exclusive and he may not bring an action of trespass.
Where, however, there is no statute, lie may bring an action of
trespass on the case.67
In Lafean v. York County,"s the property owner brought
an action of trespass and recovered damages caused by the
construction of the approaches to a bridge in the highway in
front of his property. He had instituted proceedings under the
Act of May i6, i8gi, 9 which were dismissed by the court as
inapplicable to the case. Consequently, as there was no other
statute providing a remedy, he was allowed-an action of tres-
pass. In Cooper v. Scranton City,70 trespass was brought
against the city for damages for change of grade, and judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed, the court saying that his remedy
was by proceedings before viewers either under the Act of May
23, 1889,71 relating to cities of the first class, or the Act of May
I6, i89i.72
The statutes applicable are, the Act of May 24, 1878,73
' In Borough of Beltzhoover v. Gollings, Ii Pa. 293 (1882), in an
action of trespass against a borough to recover damages for change of
grade, it was held that the statutory remedy under the Act of May 24, x878,
P. L t29, was exclusive, and that therefore so much of the claim of the
plaintiff as related to change of grade must be thrown out of the case,
quoting the provisions of the Act of March 2t, i8o6, Sec. 13, as to exclusive-
ness of statutory proceedings. See White v. Borough of McKeesport, Ioi
Pa. 394 (1882), accord. In McKee v. Pittsburgh, 7 Pa. Super. Ct.'S97
(18S), in a similar proceeding in trespass, the court held that the remedy
under the Act of May x6, 1881, P. L 75, in the case of cities, was exclusive.
In Philadelphia, where the change occurred prior to 1874, the remedy was
exclusively under the Consolidation Act of 1854. Schuler v. Philadelphia,
22 W. N. C. 161 (888); trespass judgment for defendant. Plaintiff's rem-
edy was exclusively under Consolidation Act of February 2, x854, Sec. 27,
P. L 37, which vested jurisdiction solely in the Quarter Sessions, and the
Act of June 13, 1874, P. L. 283, which gave a right of appeal See Phila-
delphia v. Wright, ioo Pa. 235 (1882). In several cases arising before a
statute was passed applicable to the case, the right to sue in trespass was
sustained. Plan 166, 143 Pa. 414 (189) ; Groff v. Phila, I5o Pa. 594 (1892) ;
Hobson v. Phila., I5O Pa. 595 (I89z). These cases are now obsolete as to
the form of action sin;:e the Act of May x6, 189I, P. L 75 Lloyd v. the
City, 17 Phila. 2o2 (I884); In re Orthodox Street, 29 W. N. C. 411 (i89a).
a 2o Pa. Super. Ct. 573 (xgoa).
P. L 75.
" 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 17 (rgo2).
'P. L 277..
tP. L 7_r2."SP.L 12%
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relating to the liability of boroughs; the Act of May 16, I89I, 74
imposing the liability on cities, and the Act 6f May 28, I9 3 ,"
relating to townships.7
The Act of lay 16, 189I,-1 provides a remedy for assess-
ing damages against a municipality for damages caused by
change of grade. Under this act the property owner may re-
cover damages for a change from original level made necessary
in order to construct sewers to abate a nuisance,"8 and may
recover damages for opening and changing from natural grade
in one proceeding. The leading case on this point is Pusey v.
City of Alleghczy, 0  in which case there was a feigned issue in
the Common Pleas on appeal from the report of viewers. The
jury returned a verdict assessing damages for (a) opening, (b)
change of grade, and it was held that judgment should be
entered for the full amount of the verdict comprising items (a)
and (b). It was contended that the property owner must pur-
sue his remedy under the Act of 187o for damages for open-
ing, and under the Act of May I, 1876,80 for the damages caused
by the grading. The court, however, said that such method of
splitting damages resulting from a single transaction was con-
trary to legal policy, and not to be supported by the acts cited.
This case has been followed ever since, and where the damages
for gradingand opening have been assessed in one proceeding,
there can be no recovery for damages when the street is subse-
quently physically opened.81  The Act of May 16, 189J,82 ap-
"p L 75.
"P. L 368.
"It is to be noted that townships were held exempt altogether from
liability for damages for change of grade on the ground that they were not
corporations invested with the power of taking private property for a public
use, and therefore liable only when so provided by act of the legislature.
Wagner v. Salzberg Township, 132 Pa. 636 (M8go). Shoe v. Township, 31
Pa. Super. Ct. 137 (1896).
"P. L 75.
"Rudderow v. Phila, x66 Pa..24z (89s).
"98 Pa. 522 (i8I).
" P. L 86.
Sedgely Ave., 217 Pa. 313 (1907). Proceedings in the Common Pleas
under the Act of i891.
Sa P. 1- 75.
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plies as well to boroughs as to cities.83 The distinction between
the Act of May i6, i89i, and the Act of May 24, 1878,1' was
pointed out in Ma.riter v. Freeport Borough. 5 Under the for-
mer act a property owner may recover damages for change of
grade of the driveway of the street without reference to the fact
of any future change of the grade of the footway.88
The construction of the Act of May 24, 1878,87 is clear.
It is not retroactive, and consequently where grade was changed
in 1871, the property owner had no remedy under it.88 -The
act authorizes the borough to direct a grading without a
petition of the majority of the property owners. The borough
is liable under the act for a change from natural grade,89 and for
a change of grade of a road running beyond the borough. 90
The cause of action accrues when the work is done on
the ground,"1 and the right of the property owner to recover
damage is not defeated by the circumstance that the change of
grade was made at his request, as he designated, and was a sub-
stantial advantage to him.92 The property owner is also en-
titled to recover damages although the change of grade was
not made immediately in- front of his property, the change only
coming to one line of his lot.S The time of taking an appeal
under the act is within thirty days from the time of filing the
report, as provided in the Act of June i 3 , 1874.94
"Nicholson Boro., 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 570 (io) ; Marcoz v. Wilmerding
Boro., 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 185 (19O8).
P. L 75.
"48 Pa. Super. Ct. 146 (xgr).'
"Frick v. Philadelphia, 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 283 (x9gs).
8" P. L 129.
"Folkenson v. Borough of Easton, 1x6 Pa. 523 (1887). It was not
decided in this case whether the right of the property owner was barred by
the statute of limitations.
"Borough of New Brighton v. Church, 96 Pa. 331 (x88o); Hendrick's
Appeal, 103 Pa. 358 (1883).
" McLain v. West Washington Boro., Vz Pa. Super. Ct. 471 (I9o6).
"Jones v. Borough of Bangor, 144 Pa. 638 (1892).
Le w is v. Borough of Darby, 166 Pa. 613 (1895). The property owner
could assert his constitutional right unless he waived it or estopped himself.
There was no evidence of either in the case.
"Lewis v. Homestead, 194 Pa. igg 0899).
"P. L. 283. Carroll v. Mt. Jewett Boro, 49 Pa. Super. Ct. zi8 (x9a).
152 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The owner of a lot which does not abut upon the street
may recover damages for change of grade if his lot is sufficiently
near the street grading to make the injury proximate, immedi-
ate and substantial.' 5 If, however, the injury is not proximate,
immediate and substantial, there can be no recovery.""
The elevation of railroad tracks in city streets, and the
change of grade of streets consequent upon the abolition of
grade crossings, have given rise to several questions. In Tucker
Street, Phtmb's App.,T a railroad elevated its tracks, which had
been constructed on its private right of way, and the city de-
pressed a street in order to abolish a grade crossing. An owner
who did not abut on the street graded but whose lot adjoined
the right of way of the railroad and who was injured by the
elevation of the railroad tracks, which increased the labor and
"In Mellor v. City, i6o Pa. 614 (894), the plaintiff's lot was situate on
a street which connected at each end with two other streets, both of which
.were graded in the same direction opposite the point of connection. The
result of this was that the plaintiff's onl, method of access at each end of
the street was rendered in one direction more difficult, and it was held that
he could recover. In .Chatham Street, i91 Pa. 604 (i&g), the plaintiff's lot
drained through two connecting alleys into the street which was graded, inconsequence of which the use of the alleys for drainage was rendered
impossible. Proceedings were under Act of i8g. In Robbins v. Scranton,
217 Pa. 577 (1907), the non-abutting owner sued to recover damages caused
by change of grade of streets in- the vicinity of his lot. The Supreme Court
ordered a new trial and said, "If as a result of the entire plan of improve-
ment the plaintiffs were afforded safe and convenient access to their prop-
erty, they could not be said to have suffered any permanent, substantial and
proximate injury as a result of the change." In Walsh v. City of Scranton,
23 Pa. Super. Ct. 276 (i9o3), a verdict for the non-abutting lotholder in the
court below was affirmed on appeal. The plaintiffs abutted on a lot fronting
on a street which opened into the street graded, and the change of grade
made vehicular traffic from the graded street into the street on which the
plaintiff's lot fronted dangerous if not impossible. Haggerty v. Scranton, 23
Pa. Super. Ct. 27o (i9o3), accord. Cf. O'Brien v. The Railroad Company,
ii9 Pa. 184 (188), senible; change of grade of street by railroad company
in constructing its road.
" In Ogontz Ave., 225 Pa. 126 (i9o9), the non-abutting owner was
refused compensation. It seems that the grade of the street was to be
elevated and the non-abutting owner claimed that the elevation of the grade
would or might injure. The Supreme Court, per Elkin, J., said: "This is too
remote a possibility to sustain a present claim for consequential damages to
a property not actually taken or disturbed in any way by opening the street."
Tucker Street. Plumb's Appeal. 166 Pa. 336 (1895); Pittsburgh's Petition,
Wilson and Snyder, etc., Co.'s Appeal, 247 Pa. 384 (i915).
" 166 Pa. 336 (i895). Pittsburgh's Pet., 247 Pa. 384 (1913), is to be
distinguished because in the former case the railroad elevated the tracks on
its own right of way, whereas, in the latter, the elevation was in the street.
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expense of shipping goods, etc., proceeded against the city- for
damages. A report of a jury in the statutory proceedings
awarding him damages was set aside on exceptions by the city,
which was affirmed on appeal. The injury was not the proxi-
mate result of the change in the grade of the street.
Where a railroad company and a city entered into an agree-
ment for the removal of grade crossings, apportioning the ex-
pense, and each assuming certain specific portions of the work,
there is no joint liability; each is liable only for damage arising
from the work done by it.98
CORPORATIONS IN HIGHWAYS.
The works of a corporation in a public highway may
cause damages to abutting and non-abutting owners, either
by the construction or enlargement of the works, or by the
operation. The highway may be a road in the country or
it may be a street in a city or borough. All of these cases must
be distinguished. We shall begin with the case of a railroad
company because that is first in historical development. 9 No
distinction has been drawn in this connection between a rural
and an urban servitude. All the cases of railroads have been
those of occupation of streets in cities and boroughs. The rea-
son no case has arisen as to a railroad in a country road is,
perhaps, because the road is either crossed or, if occupied longi-
tudinally, the old road is extinguished and a new road built. The.
damages to the abutting owner arise, therefore, simply from a
taking.
"Tucker Street, Plumb's App., 166 Pa. 235 (1895), Phila., etc., Iron
Works v. Phila., 253 Pa. 69 (xi6), affirming 24 D. R. 864 (915). In Keeling
v. Railroad Company, 205 Pa. 31 (1903), where a city and a railroad company
entered into a contract for elevating the tracks of the railroad, the abutting
owner, who filed a bill to restrain the work two months after the contract
was signed, was held barred by laches, the railroad having in the meantime
spent large sums of money and purchased and contracted to purchase valu-
able real estate on the faith of the contract.
. The reader will recollect that, prior to the Constitution of 1874, railroad
companies were not liable for damages to abutting owners caused by the
occupation of a public highway, in the absence of statutory provisions, but
that by the general railroad act still in force they were liable to abutting
owners for damages caused by an excavation or embankment in the construc-
tion of a road or street in a city or borough. See note 31 ante.
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The decisions group themselves into two classes: (A)
Those arising immediately after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion of 1874, when the chief controversy was over the consti-
tutionality of the application of Article i6, Section 8, to rail-
roads incorporated before the adoption of the constitution. (B)
Those arising in recent years in which the nature and extent of
the liability of the railroad and the nature of the right of the
abutting owner have been discussed. We shall take up the cases
in historical order.
In Railroad Company v. Patent,100 an abutting owner
brought an action on the case against the railroad company and
recovered damages for interference with access. The company
shifted its tracks on the street nearer the plaintiff's lot. The
chief controversy was as to the constitutionality of the applica-
tion of Article 16, Section 8, to the defendant, which was
chartered before 1874.
In Railroad Company v. Duncan,0 ' the abutting owner
brought trespass on the case against the Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. to recover damages caused by the occupation of Filbert
Street by the elevated road. Judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed without any discussion of. the nature of the abutting
owner's right to recover. The charter of the defendant com-
pany, which had been obtained prior to the Constitution of 1874,
did not appear to impose liability for consequential damages. The
court, however, said that by acceptance of subsequent amend-
ments the charter of the defendant became subject to the legis-
lative power, and, as a consequence, the constitutional conven-
tion, as well as the legislature, had- the power to 'subject the
company's exercise of the power of eminent domain to liability
for consequential damages (and that it was so subject presumably
by the Constitution of 1874)."° 2 In this case the discussion was
we 17 W. N. C. 198 (1885); cf. Railroad Company v. Holland, 117 Pa.
613 (1888).
1 1x Pa. 352 (j886). The plaintiff had been refused an injunction- in
94 Pa. 435 (xo).
" The decision was affirmed in the United States Supreme Court, reported
in 129 Pa. 18x (z889), which seems to affirm the proposition that the exemp-
tion from consequential liability may- be removed by the legislature, and is
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chiefly as to the constitutional question involved. The statement
claimed depreciation caused by construction and by noise and
dust of operation. It did not appear whether the evidence sup-
ported all of these allegations, and no point was raised a to
the liability for damages for operation of the railroad. This
decision was followed by several others.
In Railroad. Company v. Walsh,103 the abutting owner re-
covered damages in an action on the case against the railroad
company for damages caused by laying -down tracks in the
street in front of the plaintiff's property, these tracks having
been laid next to the curbstone and interfering with the access
to the lot.
In Railroad Company v. Zievier,104 the abutting owner also
recovered damages in an action on the case, the railroad being
constructed in the street at grade, on the ground of interference
with drainage and injury to business of a store kept in a build-
ing on the property injured, but which store did not itself abut
on the street
In Railroad Company v. McCutccon;10 a lessee of abut-
ting property brought an action on the case against . railroad
company for constructing an elevated road in the street, the
company having filed a bond to which the plaintiff had excepted,
denying the right to occupy the street and the sufficiency of the
bond. The court approved the bond without considering the
question of the right to occupy. The railroad was constructed
and put in operation and the plaintiff brought this.suit. It was
held that he could recover under the constitution for all dam-
ages direct and consequential which he had suffered or might
-suffer in consequence of the building and operation of the de-
fendant's road.
not a part of the contract between the corporation and the state. Latchford,
J., in 129 Pa. at 194, said that the Federal question involved was whether the
Acts of 1846 and 1847 constituted a contract between the state and the
defendant relieving the defendant from liability in this suit, and whether the
contract was of such a character that its obligation could not be impaired
by subsequent legislation by the state.
108124 Pa. s44 0889).
104124 Pa. 56o (x889).
18 NV. N. C. 52 (1886).
156 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA L4W REVIEW
In Quigley v. Railroad Company,'08 there were statutory
proceedings to assess damages for the right of way of a rail-
road in a street laid out but not opened, and it was held that
the company was liable as it had no power to occupy the land
of the property owner without paying damages. In this case
the street had not been brought into existence.
In Railroad Company's Appeal,10 7 where the railroad com-
pany did not have the power under the act of incorporation to
occupy the street longitudinally, the abutting owner was awarded
an injunction to restrain the company from laying the track in
the street.
In O'Malley v. Railroad Company,'108 in an action of tres-
pass, the abutting owner failed to recover damages for injuries
caused by diversion of water from the street, as there were no
facts shown on which the liability of the defendant to keep the
water off plaintiff's property could be rested.
All these cases turned on the question of whether the im-
position of the liability for consequential damages was consti-
tutional, or, the right of the abutting owner to recover under the
constitution was assumed without question; and in some of
them it seems to have been assumed without discussion that
there could be a recovery for damages caused by operation. In
the cases next to be discussed, the nature of the abutting owners
right to recover was examined, and the position taken by the
Supreme Court is open to serious objection.
In Jones v. Railroad Company,'"9 the plaintiff's lot was
situate at a corner formed by the intersection of two streets,
and the railroad crossed diagonally bet-ween the two other cor-
ners on an elevated structure that did not overhang any land of
the plaintiff except such title as he might have had to the under-
lying fee of the street. The railroad was built on its own right
of way to the edge of the street. The case was therefore more
nearly that of a street crossing than that of a longitudinal occu-
M 121 Pa. 35 (ISM).
18 W. N. C. 418 (i886).
11 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 92 (i9og).
ul is Pa. 3o (892).
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pation of a street. In this case the court said that the railroad
in a highway was an additional serviture for which the abutting
owner could recoi-er damages: that the previous decisions in
favor of the abutting owner had proceeded on the ground of a
new servitude being imposed on the land, the construction affect-
ing the adjacent owner by an interference with access and
frontage. In this the court entirely overlooked the decision of
the Philadelphia & Trenton R. R. Co.'s Appcal,110 which clearly
held that a railroad in a street was not an additional servitude.
The court went on to say that in the case at bar there was a
mere crossing made overhead for public convenience and that
there was a new servitude because the vacation of the street
would leave the owner with the burden of the overhanging
bridge. The argument, however, as to the effect upon the vaca-
tion of the street, is beside the point, because when that occurred,
if the street were taken away and the railroad left, the fee of
the abutting owner would vest to the middle of the street, and
he would then be entitled immediately to proceed for the assess-
ment of damages for the servitude which he would then find
upon his fee, to wit, the right of way of the railroad. The
theory of the law prior to the constitution of 1874 was that the
railroad use was swallowed up in the street use and was not
an additional servitude. When, therefore, the greater use
would cease, the smaller use would continue, and the abutting
owner would then be entitled to damages because of it.
The court then went on to say, as to the measure of dam-
ages, that there was no actionable injury because of noise,
smoke and dust, citing cases of operations by railroads on their
own right of way; that there was no actionable interference
with access to plaintiff's property where there was no obstruc-
tion on the street or surface; and that the plaintiff's right of
action rested on the new servitude imposed. Also, said the
court, if the elevated crossing did to an appreciable extent ex-
clude light and air from the plaintiff's dwelling or affect the
value of his property by reason of any additional servitude
"16 Whart. 25 (1840>.
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imposed on it, for the injury so sustained the plaintiff could
recover because such injury is the result of the construction
of the defendant's railroad; and the measure of damages was
not the depreciation in market value, but the injury inflicted by
means of the additional servitude imposed on the plaintiff's
property. The case was sent back for a new trial.111
In Willock v. Railroad Company, 2 the abutting owner
brought an action of trespass to recover damages to his land
caused by the construction of the defendant Railroad Co. in the
bed of the street in front of his property. The Judge in the
court below was asked to charge that the plaintiff could not
recover unless he showed title to the fee underlying the street.
He refused the point, following the well-settled law at that
time, and charged the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to
access to his property whether he owned further into the street
than the curb line or not, and that he was entitled to recover
if that access was interfered with by the construction and opera-
tion of the defendant's railroad. This was, inter alia, assigned
as error. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Elkin, who said, 13 (I) That if the abutting owner
has no title to the fee of the street he cannot recover damages
because of property taken, injured or destroyed because he has-
not suffered a legal injury. For which proposition, the learned
judge cites no authority, and for which it is believed, no,
authority can be found, for it is in direct contradiction to the
cases we have just discussed. (2) That 114 Sec. 8, Art. 16 of
the constitution "has been the source of much contention, and
our earlier cases indicate a difference of view as to its proper
interpretation." (The earlier cases are in surp-ising accord,-
and the first principal difference of view is that introduced by
21 See the language of Rice, P. J., in Shinzel v. The Telegraph Company,
31 Pa. Super. Ct. 221 at page 234 (xgo6), where he said: "But the cases above
cited (Jones v. The Railroad), as well as others, recognize this qualification
as to elevated structures, that appreciable interference with light, air, access
or drainage is an additional burden to which the land of the abutting owner
cannot be subjected without rendering to him just compensation."
222 Pa. 590 (19o9).
liP. 594.
' Middle of p. 598.
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the learned judge himself.) "But that the rule has been finally
well settled that there must be either an actual taking of or
positive and 'isible injury to the property by an abutting owner
on the street before there can be a recovery of damages."
He went on to say, "The construction of a railroad upon
a public street already dedicated to public use as a highway
imposes an additional servitude upon the owner of the fee and
one not contemplated when the street was originally laid out,"
. . . "that the foundation of the right of action is the allega-
tion that the abutting property owner has suffered some special
injury by reason of the additional servitude upon the street
caused by the construction of the railroad thereon, such, f6r
instance, as interference with drainage, access, light and air.
That injury to the complaining property must be special, differ-
ent from that of the general public or else there can be no
remedy. . . ." "Title to the property either taken or in-
jured must necessarily be in the abutting owner who complains,
because it is the taking of or injury to private property -for
which compensation is to be made. If no property be taken or
injured, there is no damage to be compensated. In all such
cases there can be no recovery unless special injuries are alleged
and proven, and the proper measure of damages is the extent
of those injuries to the abutting owner. It is true these special
injuries may depreciate the value of the property, and we see
no reason why inquiry should not be made as to the amount of
depreciation in value caused by the special injuries about which
complaint is made." In this the learned judge introduces an
entirely novel principle into the situation. There is no previous
case in which the right of the abutting owner to recover is
made to depend upon his ownership of the underlying fee.
In .Philadelphia & Trenton R. R. Co.'s Appeal,11 the
Supreme Court expressly said that it was immaterial whether
the abutting owner owned the fee or not. The whole theory of
the non-liability of the railroad for damages rested upon the
principle that the construction of the road was not an additional
servitude or burden upon the underlying fee.
ul6 Whart. 25 (1840).
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Strangely enough, the learned judge found that the plain-
tiff did have the fee to one-half of the bed of the street, and
that consequently part of the construction was upon his prop-
erty. The reasoning, therefore, that the plaintiff could not re-
cover if. he did not have the fee was mere dicta, unnecessary
to the decision of the case.116
In Hobson v. Philadelphia,' IT it was expressly decided that
an abutting owner who did not own the fee of the bed of the
street could recover damages for a change of grade. This case
was apparently not brought to the attention of the learned judge,
at least he does not attempt to distinguish it. It.is difficult to
see how it can be distinguished. In each case the right of
accessibility is interfered with, and there is no question whatever
of any injury to the underlying fee.11 "
In Christy v. Railroad Comipany,110 the plaintiff brought
trespass to recover damages caused by the defendants elevating
their tracks on the street in front of his house, which elevation,
he claimed, obstructed access and interfered with light and air.
Judgment for defendant was affirmed on the appeal, on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to show title to the bed of the
street. This case, therefore, follows the dictum in the Willock
case. It is, however, obscurely reported, and there is room to
infer from the very scanty statement of facts, that the railroad
This case came before the court again on second appeal, 229 Pa. 526
(191i). and was reversed and sent back for a new.trial because a witness
had, in fixing his estimate of the damages, taken into consideration the
danger from the operation of the road, smoke and dust, and bringing in a
cheaper class of houses, which elements, the court said, were forbidden and
could not be taken into account.
it 150 Pa. 50o (1892).
it is interesting to contrast the position taken by M1r. Justice Elkin in
this case with that which he took in the case of Philadelphia Parkway, 25o
Pa. 257 ('915), whete he decided that a property owner was entitled to
recover damages caused by the mere laying out of a street over his land
before the street was opened. In the Willock case. he said that the abutting
owner could not recover damages for injury to his property by the con-
struction of the road in the street unless he owned the fee to the bed of the
street, a proposition clearly contradicting all the previous authorities on the
subject. And, in the Philadelphia Parkway case, he reverses another well-
settled line of authorities and says that the owner was entitled in the pro-
ceeding at bar to recover damages for the injury to his property inflicted by
the presence of a laid out but unopened street over it.
211249 Pa. -- 5 (xi5), s. c. 23 D. R. 682 (I914), 24 D. R. 240 (1915).
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company occupied the street under a grant from the previous
owner, and that what they did was within the terms of that
grant.
The right to recover damages for a taking, and for inter-
ference with access, are two separate causes of action. The
distinction was maintained in the case of Kough v. Railroad
Co.,120 where the plaintiff brought an action of trespass allegink
an injury to his land and damages caused by the taking and by
the operation of the railroad. Judgment for the plaintiff -was
reversed on appeal on the ground that the evidence showed that
the railroad was constructed in the street in front of plaintiff's
property, and that the damage, if any, was caused by inter-
ference with access, and, therefore, there was a variance between
the allegata and probata.
It is submitted, therefore, that the doctrine that the. right
of the abutting owner to recover damages from a railroad
occupying the street in front of his property depends on his
ownership of the fee of the bed of the street, is unsupported by
reason or authority, and is contrary to many decisions of the
Supreme Court which were not noticed or discussed in the cases
enunciating the principle.
120a
The clause in the constitution of 1874 imposes a liability
without reference to whether there is a taking of the land in-
jured, indeed was adopted to provide for the very case where
the land is injured and not taken, and in many cases decided
since the Constitution of 1874 the Supreme Court has sustained
the right of the property owner to recover without the sugges -
tion of the idea that there was an additional servitude.
Where the railroad is constructed in a vacated or abandoned
street or road, different priinciples are applicable. In such a case,
the bed of the highway upon abandonment reverts to the abut-
ting owner in fee,121 and construction of the railroad is a taking
'"222 Pa. 175 (1908).
u' See language of the court in Faust v. Railroad Company, 3 Phila. 164"
(t858), S. c. 25 L. 1. 221. where it was said that since the plaintiff's damages
were consequential, it was unnecessary to consider whether the fee to the
bed of the street was in the abutting owner.
"Phillips v. Railroad Company, 78 Pa. 177 (1875).
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of that fee, in the strict- sense of the word, for which damages
are recoverable just as in any other case of taking. -This is
perhaps the best place to refer to the case of Curtis v. Rail-
road,1 22 where an abutting owner brought trespass against the
railroad company to recover damages to his property caused by
the relocation and elevation of a road adjacent thereto. 123  The
plaintiff was nonsuited in the court below, because, in the opinion
of the trial judge, the evidence showed that the road in question
had been vacated. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed
on the ground that the facts testified to did not show that the
road was legally vacated and that the plaintiff had not abandoned
his right to have the issue of the character of the road sub-
mitted to the jury with proper instructions as to the law. The
decision was so inconclusive as to the rights of the parties, that
it is really of little value as a precedent.
12 4
The non-abutting owner cannot recover damages against
a corporation occupying the street. In Pcnnsylvania Co. v.
Railroad Co., 1 25 a non-abutting owner brought trespass to
recover damages caused by the construction of defendant's rail-
road in the street into which plaintiff's lot had a right of way.
It was held that this right of way did not make plaintiff's lot
the abutting lot, that he had suffered no injury except, from
dust, noise and smoke arising from operation, for which no
recovery could be had, under the decision' in Pennsylsania R. R.
v. Maichant,126 and Railroad Co. v. Lippincott,127 which, how-
in25o Pa. 480 (x91s).
=While this is the statement in the report of the cause of action, its
accuracy is open to question. The railroad company had built an embank-
ment in the bed of the road, interfering with access to plaintiff's property.
The cause of action was therefore the construction of the elevation in the
road.
. If the road had been legally vacated, the p!aintiff Would probably have
had a right to recover permanent damages in trespass for the taking of the
fee. Such cause of action would be different from an action for consequen-
tial damages, Kough v. The Railroad Company, 222 Pa. 175 (19o8), and an
amendment or new writ would be necessary. If the theory of the Supreme
Court is adopted, then the plaintiff cannot recover under the case of Willock
v. The Railroad, 222 Pa. 590 (igog) without showing an ownership of the fee
of the bed of the road.
135151 Pa. 334 (x892).
ixrg Pa. s.jx
x6 Pa. 472 01887).
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ever, were not exactly in point because, they were cases where
the railroad company was operating on its own right of way.'
2 '
We now come to the case of the occupation of a highway
by a corporation other than a railroad. Here we find a distinc-
tion drawn between the occupation of a country road, which is
described as a rural servitude and therefore not sufficient in
scope to include the use by the 'orporation, and the occupation
of a city street, which is referred to as an urban servitude -suffi-
ciently extensive to allow for the corporate use. In the case
of the rural servitude, there is said to be an additional servitude
imposed by the corporation-a taking of the land of the abut-
ting owner-consequently, there is no necessityto resort to the
provisions of Article 16, Section 8 of the Constitution of 1874.
In -the case of a street in a city or borough, there is said to be
an urban use and the right of the abutting -owner to recover
depends on the provisions in the Constitution of 1874. We shall
discuss these cases in the order named.
In all cases where the construction of the corporation is
in a country road, that is, a road which is not in a city or
borough, the corporation is considered as imposing an addi-
tional servitude. In Sterling's Appeal,129 an abutting owner
obtained an injunction to prevent the laying of gas pipes in the'
public road in front of his house until compensation should
be secured or made. The Supreme Court found that the defend-
ant company had no power under its charter to lay the pipes,
which finding really disposed of the case. The court said, how-
ever, by way of dictin, assuming that the company had the
charter power, that the laying of the pipes was an additional
burden on the fee, and hence was a taking within the meaning
of the constitutional provision (Constitution of 1874, Art. 16,
Sec. 8), requiring just compensation for property injured or
destroyed. "In some cases it is possible the injury may be
consequential as well as direct." The remedy at law, said the
'Confer as to right of non-abutting owner to recover from railroad
company damages for change of grade. O'Brien v. The Railroad Company,
nig Pa. 184 (1888).
'"ti Pa. 35 (88).
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court, was inadequate, the injury being of a continuing and
permanent nature. 30 "
In Denipster v. United Traction Co.,1"' the court granted
an injunction at the instance of the abutting owner against the
construction of a street railway company in a township road
on the theory that the consent of the township authorities did
not have the same effect as the consent of a city, and conse-
quently there was only a rural servitude, and the abutting owner
could complain of the additional burden on his fee. The town-
ship did not have the statutory powers of boroughs and cities
as to the street railway. Even if it had, it is not clear from
the opinion of the court that it could exercise sucl powers unless
it was in fact a borough. This case makes the question turn
on the power of the local authorities over the road. It seems
clear that the question of whether or not there is an additional
burden on the fee of the abutting owner, cannot depend on the
nature and extent of the power of the local authorities over
the road.182
In several cases of statutory proceedings damages were
assessed against corporations occupying public -roads on the
theory that the occupation was an additional servitude, and
therefore, there was a taking of the underlying fee of the abut-
ting owner.1 33 The abutting owner may bring an action of
,, In Brown v. Electric Light Co., 208 Pa. 453 (x9o4), an injunction was
refused the abutting owner, as the bond had been filed in the statutory
proceedings.
:'205 Pa. 7o 09o3).
" In Springbrook Water Company v. Coal Company, 54 Pa. Super. Ct.
380 (1913), the water company laid its pipes in a township road without
consent of the abutting owner and without making compensation. It con-
sequently was a trespasser and unable to recover damages from an abutting
owner caused by the sinking of the road bed owing to the defendant's
mining operations.
In Shevalier v. Telegraph Co., 22 Pa. Super. Court 5o6 (9o3), on
petition for the appointment of viewers by the telegraph company, the abut-
ting owner received the depreciation in market value. The controversy was
here chiefly as to the time of the assessment of damages. In Shuster v.
Telegraph Co., 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 513 (x9o7), the construction of the tele-
phone line undoubtedly subjected the abutting owner to an additional ease-
ment for the public use. The chief controversy was over the elements of
damage. Depreciation in selling value seems to have been the measure of
damages laid down. In Tannehill v. Phila. Co.. 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 159 (1896),
pipe was laid in the public road, and the chief question was as to evidence
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trespass and recover permanent damages for the depreciation in
market value. Thus an abutting owner on a public road is
entitled to recover damages caused by construction of a street
railway company. The measure of damages is the depreciation
in market value of the abutting lot. In Thompson v. Traction
Co.,1 34 there was an action on the case. The railway company,
however, in the construction of its line, changed the grade of
the road, constructing an embankment.' The railway company
was unlawfully building without the consent of the plaintiff,
without notice, and under general misapprehension as to the
street railway law.
In Osborne v. Railway Company,'35 the trolley was built
in the borough street, and the court below was reversed for
failure to follow the rule as to measure of damages laid down
in the Thompson case, that is, assessment of permanent dam-
ages.
In Shiner v. Railway Company,13 which was an action of
trespass, the plaintiff had filed a bill for an injunction which
had been dismissed on bond being filed. The only question
involved was as to the competency of witnesses. The court
said, in sending the case back, that the plaintiff was entitled to
any appreciation in the value of property in the neighborhood
because of the construction of the trolley road.
Other cases have arisen of construction by pipe line and
telegraph companies in country roads, in which cases the abut-
ting owner has recovered damages in an action of trespass.'3 7
and competency of witnesses. In Radnor Co. v. Electric Light Co., 2o8 Pa.
460 (I9o4), which was a case of construction of poles and wires in the road,
the question arose on objection to approval of the bond as to the statutory
power of the company, which the court affirmed.
'x8, Pa. 131 (1897).
=9 Pa. Super. Ct. 632 (1899).
in 205 Pa. 648 (1893).
'"In Hankey v. Phila. Co., s Pa. Super. Ct. 148 (1897), gas pipe and
telephone lines were constructed in the public road, and the plaintiff recovered
permanent damages in trespass. The case was sent back for a new trial
because of error in treating it as an ordinary action of trespass. The
measure of damages was the difference between the market value before
and after. Zanzinger v. Electric Light Co., 6 D. R. 577 (897), abutting
owner recovered damages in an action of trespass for planting poles and
stringing wires in the public road opposite his mansion, and of which road he
owned the underlying fee. As to right of recovery against a turnpike com-
pany, see Wenger v. Rohrer, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 596 (897).
166 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In case of malice, however, the railway company will be liable
for more than the ordinary damages. 138
In the case of a highway in a city or borough, the corpora-
tion is not considered as imposing an additional servitude, there
is no taking, and the right of the abutting owner to recover de-
pends entirely on Art. I6, Sec. 8 of the Constitution of 1874.
Since no statute has been passed providing for such a case, he
must bring an action of trespass and can recover only for dam-
ages caused by construction or enlargement and not for damages
caused by operation.
In a number of cases the abutting owner was refused an
injunction against the construction of a street railway in a city
street, the company having been duly authorized to occupy the
highway."' 9
Cases of suits against a street railway at law for damages
are rare. In Starr v. Traction Co.,1 40 an abutting owner
brought trespass to recover damages, consisting of a crack in
the wall of his house, alleged to be caused by the'bumping of
defendant's cars over a switch. Nonsuit was -affirmed on appeal.
There was no evidence to show that the crack was caused by
"In Becker v. Street Railway Co., 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 367 (i9o4), the
railroad company had constructed its road without any right, against the
warning and protest of an abutting land owner. An action was brought- in
trespass and the statement claimed damages by construction and operation:
(a) interference with access and use of land, (b) interference with drain-
age. The case went off on the pleadings and was sent back for trial, the
Superior Court saying, by Rice, P. J., that it was difficult to determine the
true measure of damages until the evidence was all in.
'" Lockhart v. Rwy. Co., -39 Pa. 419 (i89i). The court said that it was
an urbane servitude, not an additional burden, not a taking of private prop-
erty, and that the legislature might authorize construction of a street railway
in a city without compensation to abutting owner. The court below, how-
ever, was riot clear, whether the damages could not be recovered at common
law. In Rafferty v. Traction Co., 147 Pa. 579 (1892), the application of an
abutting owner for an injunction against the operation of a cable street
railway in the street was refused. The railroad company was duly authorized
to lay the tracks and it had obtained municipal consent. It was held that
there was no additional servitude. Dutton v. Railway Company, i Mont.
Co. 4 (885), accord. Cooke v. Telegraph Co., 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 43 (Igo2).
Injunction against erection of pole by telephone company refused. Bill de-
murrable on other grounds. Faust v. Railroad Company, 3 Phila. 164 (1858),
25 L. 1. 221. Injunction against construction of street railway refused.
193 Pa. 536 (i89).
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the bumping nor was there any evidence of improper construc-
tion or of negligence. The judge in the court below went on
to say that the abutting owner must put tip with the noise and
inconvenience of the trolley cars in the city.
In Sockett v. Transit Co., 14°  the abutting owner owning
the fee to the middle of the street in a borough recovered dam-
ages in an action of trespass for interference with light and
air by the construction of defendant's elevated street railway
on the plaintiff's side of the street. The superstructure pro-
jected over the sidewalk within seven feet of the front wall
of plaintiff's building. A verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed,
and the court distinguished the other cases on the ground that
here tile structure was erected on the sidwalk.
In a number of other cases, the abutting owner has brought
an action for trespass caused by the damages where the con-
struction is in a street. In McDcvitt v. Gas Co.,141 a natural
gas company chartered under the Act of May 29, 1885,142 known
as the Natural Gas Act, was given permission by the City of
Pittsburgh to occupy streets. 14 The company began laying
gas pipes under the sidewalk in front of plaintiff's house. The
plaintiff applied for an injunction, which was granted and then
dissolved upon the company's giving a bond to indemnify the
plaintiff for any loss sustained. The bond was given, the gas
mains laid, and the plaintiff then began proceedings in the
Common Pleas for appointment of viewers and assessment of
damages. It was held that the laying of the pipes was. not an
additional servitude in a city street, the city having given its
62 Pa. Super. Ct. 542 (i916).
' i6o Pa. 367 (i894). The fourth paragraph of the syllabus in this case
reads as follows: "In such a case if the owners have suffered direct injury
by [the disturbed condition of the sidewalk during the process of laying the
pipe], or consequential injury to their property due to the proximity of the
pipe line, they must proceed by an action of trespass, or upon the company's
bond, if such has been given:' The clause enclosed in brackets is not in the
opinion of the court and is a notion only of the reporter. The phrase itali-
cised was said to be too broad in a note to Provost v. Water Co., 162 Pa.
275 at 279 (1894). The author of the note is not disclosed.
20P. L. 29.
" The restrictions attached to the permission were held void in Appeal
of the City of Pittsburgh, ii5 Pa. 4 (i886).
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consent; that the fact that the pipes were laid under the side-
walk did not alter the rule, and as there was, therefore, no
exercise of the power of eminent domain, the proceeding for
appointment of viewers was inappropriate. The'court said that
if the lots were affected in value it was as a consequence of
the proximity of the pipe line and not because of anything done
on or to them. The remedy in such a case is by action or tres-
pass or upon the bond given, to secure the dissolution of the
injunction.
In Provost v. Water Co.,1 4 4 the water company laid a main
in the sidewalk in the city street in front of plaintiff's premises.
After the water main was laid, it appeared that the abutting
lot was thereby prevented from constructing certain cellar steps,
basement windows, etc. The abutting owner, who bought after
the main was laid, brought an action of trespass against the
water company, and the court gave binding instructions for
the defendant on the ground that the action was personal to
the owner of the land at the time of laying the pipes, which
decision was affirmed on appeal. The plaintiff had no cause
of action as his only damages were those caused by the laying
of the pipe interrupting access. In Shinzel v. Bell Telephone
Co.,1 45 the abutting owner brought trespass for damages caused
by the erection of a pole in a street in Philadelephia in front of
plaintiff's property. It was held he could recover for the appreci-
able interference with light, air, accessibility and frontage, but
could not recover for unsightliness of poles and noises ordinarily
incident to the operation, without negligence, of the lawful
business, and from the maintenance of the poles and wires.
In Bartholomezu v. Telephone Comnpany, 45 a a bill in equity
was filed by the abutting owner of a lot in the Borough of Sun-
bury, and the court, conceding the lawful right of the tele-
phone company to occupy the street, issued an injunction specifi-
cally controlling the location of a pole in front of plaintiff's lot
1, 162 Pa. 275 (1894).
'"31 Pa. Super. Ct. 221 (i96).
', I Pa. C. C. R. 39o (xgo.).
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in order to prevent irreparable injury to the lot and the imposi-
tion of undue and unnecessary burdens thereon.
The reason for the distinction between the rural and urban
servitude is not very clear and seems -to have been assumed with-
out much discussion. Nothing has been found in the books
except the remarks of Mr. Justice Dean, as follows:
"It is settled law, that abutting owners on streets and alleys in
cities and boroughs have no claim for damages by reason of the
appropriation of the surface or subsurface for public improvements
to the advantage and benefit of all the inhabitants; it is much easier
to say that such is the settled law, than to give a wholly satisfactory
reason for it; the one usually given both in McDevitt v. People's
Nat. Gas Co., i6o Pa. 367, and in many cases preceding it, is, that
the borough is the representative of the inhabitants, considering
their health, their family comfort and their business needs; and
every lot owner shares in the benefits which such an appropriation
of the streets and alleys confers. If it abridges his control of the
soil, it makes him a sharer in the public advantage resulting from
the appropriation. In a legal sense, it is an invasion of his rights,
but that is damnmt absque injuria. But whether the reasoning to
sustain the law be satisfactory or not, as a fact, the law is so deeply
imbedded and firmly fixed as a rule of action, that it is not likely to.
be disturbed, at least in our day." 241b
(To be concluded.)
Roland R. Foulke.
Philadelphia.
"sb Dempster v. United Traction Co.. 20.; Pa. 7o at 78 (9o3) ; see also
remarks of Rice. P. J., in Shinzel v. Telephone Co., 31 Pa. Super..Ct. _221 at
23! (9o6), and of Green, J., in Wood Y. fMcGrath, i5o Pa. 451 at 455, et seq.
(1892).
